Evolutionary quantum game by Kay, Roland et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
01
02
00
8v
1 
 1
 F
eb
 2
00
1
Evolutionary quantum game
Roland Kay, Neil F. Johnson and Simon C. Benjamin
Physics Department and Center for Quantum Computation,
Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford University, Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3PU, U.K.
(November 10, 2018)
We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game.
Each agent has a ‘memory’ of her performance over the pre-
vious m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The
game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the
classical game performs better, while for intermediate m the
relative performance depends on whether the source of qubits
is ‘corrupt’. For large m, the quantum players dramatically
outperform the classical players by ‘freezing’ the game into
high-performing attractors in which evolution ceases.
PACS Nos.: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le, 03.65.Ta
The new field of quantum games is attracting signifi-
cant interest [1–4]. We recently conjectured [5] that novel
features should arise for quantum games with N ≥ 3
players. Benjamin and Hayden [6] subsequently created
a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like game for N = 3 with a high-
payoff ‘coherent quantum equilibrium’ (CQE). Johnson
[7] showed that this quantum advantage can become a
disadvantage when the game’s external qubit source is
corrupted by a noisy ‘demon’. So far, all studies have
been restricted to static games.
Here we introduce an iterated version of the game,
where players (agents) may modify their strategies based
on information from the past – i.e. they ‘learn’ from
their mistakes [8]. This evolutionary game produces
highly non-trivial dynamics in both quantum and clas-
sical regimes, and represents the first step toward un-
derstanding iterated games employing temporal quan-
tum coherence. Agents are provided with the minimum
resources necessary for adaptability - specifically, each
agent posesses a measure of her past success through a
parameter $m whose value reflects the payouts from re-
cent rounds of the game. The fixed ‘memory’ param-
eter m effectively governs the number of rounds upon
which $ depends (see later Eq. (1)), and turns out to be
fundamental for deciding the relative superiority of the
quantum and classical games. For small memory m, the
classical game is superior (in the sense that the average
payout per player is higher). For intermediatem, relative
superiority is determined by the reliability of the exter-
nal qubit source, while for large m the quantum game
is radically superior due to evolutionary ‘freezing’ into a
high-paying attractor.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
M
ea
n 
to
ta
l p
ay
ou
t
memory ’depth’ m
Mean payoffs over 10,000,000 iterations
m
e
a
su
re
m
e
n
t0
0 J J
M
0
1
M2
M3qu
bi
ts
 in
 z
er
o 
st
at
e
Quantum, s=0
Quantum, s=1
Classical, s=0 or 1
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 1
( 0, 0, 0)
(-9,-9, 1)
(-9, 1,-9)
( 1,-9,-9)
( 1, 9, 9)
( 9, 9, 1)
( 9, 1, 9)
( 2, 2, 2)
Measure Payoff
FIG. 1. Mean total payout per turn as a function of the
memory size m. Curve with crosses in boxes: classical game
with input qubit source 0 or 1. Curves with crosses: quantum
games with input qubit source |0〉 and |1〉 respectively. Upper
inset: Payoff table for our three-player game. Lower inset:
circuit diagram showing flow of information in the general
quantum game. When the J gates are removed, the game
becomes classical.
We briefly review the static version of the game [6,7].
The basic idea is to establish the flow of information in
a game, and then investigate the consequences of quan-
tizing this information. In the classical static game, each
of the N = 3 players receives a bit in the zero state, and
chooses either to ‘flip’, or ‘not flip’ this bit prior to re-
turning it. The three bits are then measured, and the
payoff to the players is determined by the table shown in
Fig. 1. This payoff table is such that each player’s best
choice of strategy is simply to choose to ‘flip’ regardless of
what any other player may be doing. Given that all play-
ers realize this, the inevitable outcome is that all play-
ers choose ‘flip’ - this is the game’s ‘dominant strategy
equilibrium’ (DSE). The final measured state is there-
fore 111, and the corresponding payout to each player
is just 2 points. This result arises despite the existence
of cooperative strategies, such as each player choosing
‘flip’ with probability 80%, which would yield a higher
(expected) payoff to all players: the problem is that any
given player is better off switching strategy to ‘definitely
flip’ hence this cooperative strategy profile does not oc-
cur. This is exactly the same defection problem seen in
the famous game Prisoner’s Dilemma. The quantization
process [6] involves: (a) generalizing each bit to a qubit
α|0〉 + β|1〉, (b) generalizing the moves available to the
1
players from ‘flip’/‘don’t flip’ to a set of quantum opera-
tions, and (c) introducing ‘gates’ to entangle the qubits
- specifically the entangling gate is Jˆ = 1√
2
(Iˆ⊗3 + iFˆ⊗3)
where Fˆ = σˆx. Without entanglement, the quantum
game is trivially equivalent to the classical variant [6]
- therefore we can make a correspondence between the
quantum and classical games simply by removing the J
gates. The lower inset in Fig.1 shows the flow of informa-
tion in the quantum game. In general the actions of the
players in the quantum game will result in a final state
which is a superposition. Measurement then collapses
this state to one of the classical outcomes, and the payoff
is then be determined from the table (see Fig. 1) as in
the classical game. Among the conclusions of Ref. [6] was
the discovery that the quantum players could escape the
DSE that traps the classical players, and hence outper-
form the classical players by a considerable factor. In Ref.
[7] it was shown that this quantum advantage depends
on the reliability of the source of qubits: if the source is
believed to be generating qubits in the |0〉 state, but is
in fact generating qubits in state |1〉, then the classical
game players will out-perform the quantum ones.
Following the previous literature on iterated classical
multi-player games [8], we limit the classical moves to
three options: ‘definitely flip’, ‘definitely do not flip’ and
‘flip with probability 1/2’. These options are denoted
by setting p, the probability of leaving the input qubit
unflipped, equal to 0,1 or 1/2 respectively. This sim-
plification from the full (continuous) range of physically
possible p values clarifies the analysis while retaining the
basic structure of the game. There are now 33 = 27 pos-
sible profiles or ‘configurations’ (p1, p2, p3). These yield
ten ‘classes’ each containing C ≥ 1 configurations which
are equivalent under interchange of player label [8]. The
upper table in Fig. 2 shows the average payoffs for each
configuration class for the classical game. Given that
the input is 0, the dominant strategy equilibrium corre-
sponds to all players choosing p = 0, i.e. class (iv) in the
table. Hence although the continuous-parameter p-space
has been discretized to only three values, this description
includes the fundamental dominant strategy equilibrium.
To maintain a correspondence between the quantum
and classical games, we also permit our quantum players
just three different moves: Iˆ, σˆx, and
1√
2
(σˆx+ σˆz). It was
earlier shown that these moves can give rise to superior
quantum performance for the static quantum game with
reliable qubit source [6]. Moreover when the entangling
J gates are removed, making the game classical, these
three moves correctly correspond to our allowed classi-
cal moves p = 1, 0, 1/2 (respectively). Therefore we label
the three quantum moves with the same p notation. A
fully comprehensive study of the quantum game would
also examine the case where the players are permitted a
larger set of moves, e.g. one that is closed under compo-
sition. However the aim here is to make a first direct
move-for-move comparison between the iterated quan-
tum and classical games, and this necessitates restricting
the larger set of quantum options. The resulting table
(see Fig. 2) provides a simple quantum analog of the
classical case.
Class p=0 p=1/2 p=1 Average
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
a(-15/4)[19/4]1/2
aa(-7/2)[9/2]1/2
aaa(2)[0]1
a(1)[1]1
aa(9)[-9]0
a(5)[-4]1/2
aaa(-15/4)[19/4]1/2
aa(-15/4)[19/4]1/2
a(3/2)[1/2]1
a(9)[-9]0
aa(19/4)[-15/4]1/2
a(3/2)[1/2]1
aaa(0)[2]1
aa(-9)[9]0
a(1)[1]1
a(5)[-4]1/2
a(19/4)[-15/4]1/2
aa(-7/2)[9/2]1/2
(-15/4)[19/4]
(-15/4)[19/4]
(-11/6)[19/6]
(2)[0]
(0)[2]
(-17/3)[19/3]
(19/3)[-17/3]
(19/3)[-17/3]
(19/4)[-15/4]
(-11/6)[19/6]
Quantum
Class p=0 p=1/2 p=1 Average
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
a(21/4)[-17/4]1/2
aa(11/2)[-9/2]1/2
aaa(2)[0]1
a(1)[1]1
aa(9)[-9]0
a(5)[-4]1/2
aaa(1/2)[1/2]1/2
aa(3/4)[1/4]1/2
a(3/2)[1/2]1
a(0)[0]0
aa(1/4)[3/4]1/2
a(1/2)[3/2]1
aaa(0)[2]1
aa(-9)[9]0
a(1)[1]1
a[-4][5]1/2
a(-17/4)[21/4]1/2
aa(-9/2)[11/2]1/2
(1/2)[1/2]
(9/4)[-5/4]
(25/6)[-17/6]
(2)[0]
(0)[2]
(-17/3)[19/3]
(19/3)[-17/3]
(1/3)[1/3]
(-5/4)[9/4]
(-17/6)[25/6]
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FIG. 2. Average payoffs for classical game (upper) and
quantum game (lower). Agents are denoted by ‘a’. p cor-
responds to the probability of not flipping the input qubit -
for the quantum case, p is an operator (see text). Average
payoffs for input qubit 0 are shown as (. . .); those for input 1
are shown as [. . .]; those for 50 : 50 mixture of input qubits are
shown without parentheses. Final column gives the average
payoff per player for a given input qubit.
We assume that in both quantum and classical games,
players are unable to communicate between themselves
and hence cannot coordinate which player picks which
strategy. In the quantum game, this is more critical since
the CQE (i.e. the Nash equilibrium given by class (viii)
in the lower table of Fig. 2) involves players using differ-
ent p’s. We will find that the evolutionary aspect of our
iterated game allows the quantum players to find coop-
erative solutions even in the absence of communication,
provided that the memory m is not too small.
The agents are allowed to evolve (‘mutate’) their
strategies based on past success, according to the fol-
lowing prescription. After timestep t − 1, each player
holds a ‘moving average’ $m,t−1 of her payoffs which is
then updated at timestep t:
$m,t =
m− 1
m
$m,t−1 +
1
m
∆t (1)
where $m,t is the updated moving average and ∆t is the
payoff to the player at turn t. The information about
previous outcomes therefore has a ‘half life’ since the
contribution of a given round’s payoff falls exponentially
2
with successive rounds. When the player’s moving aver-
age falls below a certain threshold d, she mutates - she
chooses one of the other two allowed strategies with a
50 : 50 chance. After mutation, the moving average $m
continues to be updated, but the player enters a ‘trial pe-
riod’ of Y turns before considering mutating again. For
simplicity, we set Y = m for the remainder of this paper.
We also consider fixed external qubit source orientations,
although each of these restrictions can be relaxed. We
choose a mutation threshold d = 3.0 in order to be above
the 2 point maximum possible payoff per player in the
classical static game (see payoff table in Fig. 1). We per-
formed runs with 107 timesteps - this is sufficient for the
resulting statistics to be stable to within a few percent.
Figure 1 shows the results for the average payoff per
turn for the three agents combined. The classical domi-
nant strategy equilibrium (2, 2, 2) corresponds to a value
6, while the CQE (5, 9, 5) and its permutations corre-
spond to a value 19. Figure 3 shows the corresponding
average lifetime of the agents before mutation. Figure 1
shows that for memorym < 8, the quantum game players
are worse off than the classical game players regardless
of the input qubit source orientation (0 or 1). (The par-
ticular orientation of the fixed source doesn’t affect the
results for the classical game.) The classical game play-
ers are also less prone to mutation, as seen from Figure
3. For 8 < m < 25, the quantum game players do better
than the classical players if the source is 0 (as they be-
lieve it is) but do worse if the source is 1 (i.e. the source
is ‘corrupt’ [7]). The same is qualitatively true for the
lifetimes (Fig. 3) but for a smaller range 8 < m < 19.
For m > 25, the quantum game players achieve better
average payoffs than the classical game players irrespec-
tive of the source orientation, but those with the reliable
(i.e. non-corrupt) source do significantly better. They
eventually ‘freeze’ into a cooperative state, as explained
later.
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FIG. 3. Average time agents maintain a given strategy be-
fore mutating, as a function of the memory m. Inset: Results
for a larger y-scale, illustrating the ‘freezing’ of the dynamics
in the quantum game with a reliable qubit source (s = 0).
Figure 1 reveals an interesting effect within the classi-
cal game: for m > 1 the classical game players do better
than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium value
of 2 + 2 + 2 = 6. If we had set the threshold d ≤ 2,
the players would quickly ‘freeze’ into the configuration
p = 0, 0, 0, which guarantees 2 points per player per turn.
By adopting a higher satisfaction limit, i.e. by being
more ‘greedy’, the classical players introduce instability
into the game – although this implies that in any given
round at least one player is typically worse off, in the
long term the instability actually benefits all the players.
The explanation for the interesting large m behavior
lies in the cycles through which the game moves on short
and long timescales. In general, the behavior of both
classical and quantum systems for larger m is dominated
by a small number of possible attractors which trap the
system for a certain period, before it jumps into a brief
period of turbulence and then ends up in another attrac-
tor.
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FIG. 4. Schematic game dynamics showing the attractors
which dominate both the classical and quantum games in the
large m limit. (a) The classical game, and (b) the quantum
game with a reliable source (s = 0). Ellipses represent spe-
cific strategy profiles and are labeled by the p values adopted
by the three players. The circle labeled T represents the set
of all other profiles, which are visited only during brief tur-
bulent periods in the game’s dynamics. Arrows indicate the
probability that one profile follows another over a period of
m rounds. Data are collected over 107 rounds with m = 30.
In the classical game the profile (p1 = 0, p2 = 0, p3 = 0), cor-
responding to the dominant strategy equilibrium, occurs in
each of the three attractor cycles.
Figure 4 shows the structure of the attractors in the
classical and quantum cases. In the classical game, the
attractors correspond to two players fixing their strategy
as ‘definitely flip’ (p = 0). While they maintain these
choices, the third player can never achieve satisfactory
payouts, hence the short timescale dynamics correspond
to this third player jumping around the three possible p
values, constantly mutating. Eventually one of the other
two players will encounter a run of losses and mutate her
strategy. The game then enters a (poorly performing)
turbulent period before settling back into either the pre-
vious attractor or one of the 2 permutation-equivalent
cycles. In the quantum case, however, these three short
cycles are replaced by six attractors, each a single config-
3
uration such as p = 0, 1, 1/2. Because all such attractors
yield satisfactory expected payoff to all players, the sys-
tem will remain in an attractor until one player has an
exceptionally long run of losses. Figure 3 indicates that
the probability of this occurence falls exponentially with
m - i.e. the system ‘freezes’ into one configuration profile.
In summary, we have presented the first results for
an evolutionary quantum game. The dynamics are non-
trivial, even in the present case where the game’s history
is assumed to be classical in that a measurement is taken
at each timestep. The next logical step is to to allow for
a superposition (or ‘multiverse’) of histories over R > 1
turns. Because the coherence in the present game need
only be maintained for R = 1 turns, the present game
could be implemented as an algorthim in an elementary
quantum computer containing 3 or more qubits - such
an experiment could be performed with existing NMR
technologies. More generally, it is not inconceivable that
such ‘games’ are already being played at some micro-
scopic level in the physical world - indeed, it has recently
been shown that nature plays classical dominant-strategy
games using clones of a virus that infects bacteria [10].
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